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“Matters Canadian” and the
Problem with Being Special
Robert T. Frederick on the First
Special Service Force
James Wood

O

n 12 July 1942, the Canadian Army
authorized the movement of nearly seven
hundred officers and men to the United States
for training as part of the First Special Service
Force (FSSF), a highly-specialized commando
unit that was being organized for the purpose of
conducting raids in the alpine regions of occupied
Europe. 1 From the summer of 1942 until
disbandment in December 1944, this combined
“North American” force consisted of soldiers
drawn from the armies of both Canada and the
United States. From the Aleutian Islands, to
Monte la Difensa, Rome, and ending in Southern
France, this élite US-Canadian infantry brigade
established a remarkable combat record and
became a symbol of the lasting partnership
between our two countries. Today, the First
Special Service Force is remembered both in
Canada and the United States for its outstanding
achievements in combat as well as its unique,
bi-national composition.
Prior to 1942, Canadian soldiers had never
served in such close association with the US
Army, and even the post-war era has seen
no similar examples of such near-complete
integration. Within the Force, Canadian and
American soldiers wore the same uniforms,
carried the same weapons, and answered to
the same superiors regardless of nationality –
an American private could take orders from a
Canadian sergeant, who in turn answered to an
American or Canadian lieutenant. At the top of
this bi-national chain of command stood Robert
T. Frederick, US Army, the man who organized
and led the First Special Service Force from its

activation on 2 July 1942 until his departure
on 23 June 1944, shortly after Rome fell to the
Allies.

Robert T. Frederick

A

Coast Artillery officer by training, Frederick’s
appointment to command the First Special
Service Force came about largely by default.
In the spring of 1942, while working as a staff
officer in the Operations Division of the US
War Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick
was assigned the task of completing a detailed
assessment of Operation PLOUGH by MajorGeneral Dwight D. Eisenhower. Operation
PLOUGH was a British scheme that called for the
creation of specialized commando detachments,
trained in winter warfare and equipped with
armoured snow vehicles. The “PLOUGH Force,”
as it was called, would be capable of conducting
parachute or glider landings in occupied Norway,
where the mobility provided by the proposed
snow vehicle would allow the raiders to sabotage
German-controlled hydroelectric dams and
power plants throughout the country. Although
Frederick’s report harshly criticized Operation
PLOUGH, noting especially that the plan made
no adequate provision for evacuating the raiding
force upon completion of its mission, his lack
of enthusiasm failed to dissuade his superiors
from the project. Instead, Eisenhower appointed
Frederick to take command of the PLOUGH Force
itself. On 9 June 1942, Ike called the young staff
officer into his office and told him: “Frederick,
take this plough project. You’ve been over the
whole thing. You’re in charge now. Let me know
what you need.”2
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Forcemen pick their way down a ravine during a September 1942 route march near Helena, Montana. The
walking sticks are being used as substitute ski-poles in preparation for ski training during the winter months.

In hindsight, Eisenhower would have been hardpressed to select a more suitable candidate to
command the First Special Service Force. From
the unit’s baptism of fire atop Monte la Difensa
to its mad-dash to the Tiber bridges during the
liberation of Rome, this former War Department
staff officer earned the respect and trust of his
men by his near-constant presence on the front
lines. During the most critical stages of any given

battle, the best place to look for Frederick was
said to be “up forward somewhere with the men
who did the fighting.”6 Leading from the front,
even after his promotion to brigadier-general in
January 1944, Frederick became the recipient
of no less than eight Purple Hearts for wounds
sustained in combat, earning him the dubious
distinction of being the most shot-at-and-hit
general officer of the Second World War. His
wounds were a testament to his bravery and, to
a lesser extent, his proclivity to leave the dayto-day operation of Force Headquarters to his
subordinates.
Time away from headquarters is likely to have
provided Frederick with some respite from the
daily complexities of administering the First
Special Service Force, burdened as it was not
only by the existence of a sizable foreign element
in its ranks, but also having to contend with
the designation of being “special”. The Second
World War generated a remarkable number of
highly-specialized military formations – from
parachute infantry and glider troops to Royal
Marine Commandos and Ranger Battalions.
As with many of these special units, higher
commanders did not always make allowances
for the unique strengths and weaknesses of
the First Special Service Force. For example,
although the brigade-sized FSSF was equipped
with more light machine guns and light mortars
than a standard US infantry division,7 overall, the
unit traded firepower for mobility by carrying no
heavy machine guns and no mortars larger than
a 60mm. The Force was not originally intended

CWM 19900261-012

Modest and unassuming, Frederick always
insisted that his selection to command the FSSF
came as a result of other, more qualified officers
turning down the job. 3 Indeed, Frederick’s
initial reaction to Eisenhower’s offer was to
protest that he was completely unqualified for
the position, noting in particular his complete
lack of infantry training and his unfamiliarity
with parachuting, mountain operations, and
winter warfare.4 These objections were duly
noted and ignored, perhaps due to the fact that
Eisenhower was leaving for the UK in a few days
to take command of the US European Theater of
Operations and did not want to leave behind any
loose-ends in Washington. Another possibility is
that Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British Chief
of Combined Operations and a key proponent of
Operation PLOUGH, had some influence in the
decision and viewed Frederick’s appointment to
command the Force as an ideal means of silencing
his criticism of the project.5 Regardless of the
reasons, on 2 July 1942, the First Special Service
Force was activated by an order of the US War
Department, with the newly-promoted Colonel
Robert T. Frederick as the officer commanding.
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for frontal attacks against conventionally-armed
opponents, the breakout from Anzio and the
battle of Artena notwithstanding.
As an added complication, although Canadian
officers and men were evenly distributed among
the three battalion-sized “Regiments” of the
Force, on paper, they remained grouped within
the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion. This
Canadian element of the Force received its pay
and reinforcements from within the Canadian
system and its officers and men remained subject
to the King’s Orders and Regulations.8 As a result
of this arrangement, the First Special Service
Force operated within two military systems and
answered to two very separate chains of authority.
While the difficulties resulting from “matters
Canadian” and the special status of the Force
were by no means so severe as to merit Frederick
getting shot eight times in order to avoid
spending time at headquarters, one should not
underestimate the frustration of a commanding
officer who was forced to deal with not one, but
two military bureaucracies.

Military Relations Between the United States
and Canada viewed the FSSF to be a model of
cooperation between the Allied armies, though
he did offer the following conclusion to his
assessment of the Force:
Throughout its combat history, the First
Special Service Force engaged but little in
the highly specialized types of operations for
which it had been trained…. Furthermore, the
very nature and status of the force required
frequent attention of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff to proposals for employment of this group
of less than 2,000 men, as well as diplomatic
exchanges to obtain Canadian acceptance of
proposals – all in all an inordinate amount
of high-level consideration in relation to the
size of the force. But from the point of view of
Canadian-US relations, the unique experiment
was a remarkable success.9

One Force, Two Official Histories

In Canada, official historian C.P. Stacey was
even less enthusiastic. Surveying the difficulties
involved in organizing the 1st Canadian Special
Service Battalion and maintaining it in the theatre
of war, an effort that required the repeated
attention of Canadian authorities in Ottawa,
Washington, and London, Stacey offered the
following advice to his Canadian readers:

n the 1950s and 60s, official historians in both
Canada and the United States devoted
considerable attention to the First Special Service
Force. In the United States, Stanley W. Dziuban’s

The First Special Service Force was a fine
fighting unit, and the relations of Canadians and
Americans within it seem to have left very little
to be desired. Nevertheless, the administrative

I

Force training emphasized physical and mental endurance. The soldiers seen here are
on a particularly grueling route march that covered a remarkable 47.6 miles in one day.

19
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003

3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 3

G. Ronald collection, CWM/MCG Archives

The rugged terrain of the Montana hills provided
ideal training conditions as the Force prepared for a
parachute descent into occupied Europe for the purpose
of destroying German-held hydroelectric dams and
other targets. Unfortunately, Operation PLOUGH was
cancelled before the Force had a chance to put many of
its unique capabilities to use.

and other difficulties that were encountered in
connection with it – in matters of pay, decorations,
and the tendency of the United States to regard
Canadian members of this international unit as
Canadians serving in the U.S. Army – suggest that
any such enterprise should not be undertaken on
another occasion without careful thought.10
Stacey and Dziuban indicate that the First
Special Service Force was an administrative
handful for the Canadians and a political football
for the United States. Both historians recognize
that these difficulties posed no insurmountable
obstacles within the Force itself, where relations
between Canadian and American soldiers were,
on the whole, excellent. Nevertheless, the US
official historian points to the disproportionate
amount of high-level consideration of the
Force and the failure to make full use of the
unit’s special training as causes for concern.
Further, while Dziuban dismisses Canadian
“administrative complications” by stating
that these “were in the over-all so small and
were handled so competently by the Canadian
administrative personnel that they were hardly
apparent to U.S. members of the force staff,”11
the Canadian official historian quite obviously
disagrees.

What did Frederick think of all this? Did
the special capabilities of the FSSF merit the
high-level consideration it received? Did the
Force Commander consider the presence of a
Canadian element within the unit to be a help
or a hindrance? After the war, Frederick tended
to provide only a tactfully-vague response to any
question regarding the use and misuse of the
Force or the relative merits of the unit’s bi-national
composition.12 On at least three occasions during
his tenure as Force Commander, however,
Frederick provided his superiors with detailed
reports on the unique difficulties encountered
by his command. His letters, now held by the
US National Archives in College Park, Maryland,
and the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford
University, provide direct answers to difficult
questions, particularly in regards to the challenge
of finding a mission suited to the special training
and capabilities of the Force and the international
complications that dogged the unit at every stage
of its existence. Taken together, these letters
indicate that these problems were never fully
solved to the Force Commander’s satisfaction,
thereby offering some of the best insight available
into the final decision, in December 1944, to
disband the First Special Service Force, return
the Canadians to their own army, and reorganize
the American element along the lines of a
conventional US Army infantry regiment.

“Use It or Lose It”: Finding a
Mission, February 1943

I

n late September 1942, Frederick travelled to
the United Kingdom in order to discuss the
development of Operation PLOUGH. It was
during this visit that the Force Commander
learned of a potentially-disastrous lapse of
communication between the British authorities
and the PLOUGH planning headquarters in
Washington. For starters, Frederick learned
that the British Chief of Air Staff had expressed
serious reservations about the project, as he was
reluctant to divert bombers from their assigned
missions over Germany in order to parachute the
Force and its vehicles into Norway. Before doing
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so, the Air Chief would have to be convinced
that Operation PLOUGH could result in greater
damage to the enemy than bombing Germany
directly.13 Further, in London, a representative of
the Special Operations Executive (SOE) informed
Frederick that his organization already had a
plan for destroying Norwegian hydroelectric
stations using Norwegian saboteurs. Finally,
the Norwegian government-in-exile was voicing
strong opposition to the PLOUGH project as
they expected the destruction of Norway’s
infrastructure to cause greater hardship for the
Norwegian people than it would for the German
occupiers. In short, Operation PLOUGH was
about to be permanently sidelined, and on
26 September, Frederick cabled the following
message to Washington:

was to approach the Canadian authorities to
request their continued involvement in the Force.
One condition of Canadian participation in
the FSSF had been that any overseas deployment
of Canadian soldiers required the approval of
the Canadian Government. With the cancellation
of Operation PLOUGH, however, Frederick now
considered the Canadian’s right of refusal to
be a brake on the usefulness of the Force as a
whole. In the autumn of 1942, nearly half of the
combat echelon of the Force was composed of
Canadian officers and enlisted men. In the event
of these Canadians not being permitted to take
part in an operation, Frederick reasoned that
their withdrawal would require an extensive
and time-consuming reorganization of the Force
as a whole. “It is believed that in fairness to the
United States,” he wrote, on 16 October 1942,
“the Canadian Government should at this time
specifically state any limitations upon the combat
employment of the Canadian personnel of the
Force.”15

Suspend effort on present line…. New plan
may be radically different and not concerned with
hydroelectric or other industrial installations….
Cease training on hydroelectric installations
and…stress general tactical training, to include
attack of fortifications, pill boxes, barracks and
troop concentrations. Change in weapons may
be necessary to provide greater firepower, so
suspend further small arms training pending a
decision.14

Above right: Parachute training in the Helena Valley,
summer 1942. Parachute qualification was one of the
first orders of business for volunteers arriving at Fort
William Henry Harrison, a process Colonel Frederick
hoped might help “separate the sheep from the goats.”
Below right: A soldier struggles with his deployed
parachute in a stiff breeze during parachute training at
Helena. While Canadian soldiers were officially grouped
within the 2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion for
administrative purposes, in practice, they were integral
to the Force and did not form a separate contingent of
their own
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Returning to the United States in October,
Frederick reported the results of his visit to
Lieutenant-General McNarney, the US Army’s
Deputy Chief of Staff, who ordered all planning
stopped pending a decision by the Chief of Staff,
General George C. Marshall. Given that the
United States had originally adopted PLOUGH
at the suggestion of the British, and since that
time had devoted considerable resources to
its development, Marshall and McNarney were
quite understandably exasperated by this turn
of events. However, in light of the investment
already made in training and equipping the Force,
not to mention development of the snow vehicle,
Marshall decided to retain the FSSF for possible
employment in other theatres. All that remained

Stating specific limitations in advance,
however, was something that the Canadians
simply were not prepared to do, as this would
allow the United States to send the Force,
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without notification, to any theatre that was not
specifically ruled out. Instead, the acting Chief
of General Staff (CGS) in Ottawa, Major-General
J.C. Murchie, suggested that Canada retain its
right of approval prior to any deployment, but
conceded that once this approval had been given,
“the Canadian Government should not further
reserve the right to withdraw the Canadian
element from participation.”16

Canadian Government should relinquish the
right to withdraw the Canadians of the FSSF
once approval for the general project had been
given. In a letter to the Canadian Minister of
National Defence, Murchie stated his opinion that
once Canadian approval had been given…“we
can safely leave the operational planning to the
United States authorities. They are not given to
rash military undertakings.”18

Comparing the FSSF to other examples
of Canadians serving alongside Allied forces,
Murchie agreed with Frederick that the
circumstances of the Force were entirely different
from those affecting other commands:

On 30 October, the US War Department
accepted Murchie’s recommendations as the
basis of continued Canadian participation in
the Force. In Washington, Frederick’s staff began
to consider alternate missions for the FSSF,
including operations in the Mediterranean or the
Soviet Caucasus.19 At the Force training grounds
in Helena, Montana, the intensive program of
physical conditioning, tactical problems, and
battle drill continued, alongside a rigorous
program of instruction in skiing, mountain
climbing, and winter warfare.20

In the event that a Canadian force, acting in
combination with the forces of our allies, did
not propose to proceed with a given operation,
this would not affect the independent action of
the forces of the other allies involved….Should,
however, the Canadian element of the First
Special Service Force be similarly withdrawn, it
would mean, in effect, the disappearance of the
Force as such, and the cancellation of the project
to which it had been assigned.17

G. Ronald collection, CWM/MCG Archives

This essential difference between the First
Special Service Force and other Canadian
forces acting in combination with Allied troops
seemed to be of sufficient importance that the

By February 1943, however, the unit was still
in training and no new mission had materialized.
Soon it would be spring and, with the snow
already disappearing in Europe, the Force would
be stuck in training for another year. Seeing no
possible use for the FSSF in the winter of 1943,
on 3 February, Frederick wrote the following to
Lieutenant-General McNarney:21
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:
Subject: First Special Service Force
The time has been reached when it is necessary to decide
the future of the First Special Service Force. The First Special
Service Force was created specifically for the accomplishment
of the Plough Project at the request of British authorities,
but in October, 1942, the Project was dropped due to the
impracticability of executing it during the winter of 19421943. Reasons for abandoning the project were that planning
information furnished by the British mission assigned to the
project was faulty and erroneous, airplanes to drop the Force
into the combat area are not available, and the Norwegian
Government did not favour the project or its objective.
At the time that the Plough Project was dropped, a new
mission for the First Special Service Force was sought. After
consideration of several possible missions, it was directed
that the Force complete its winter training with a view to
its employment in Sicily, Sardinia or Italy early in 1943. In
accordance with the last directive, the Force has continued
its winter training and an attempt has been made to prepare
the Force for any operation in which it may be employed.
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Private John Johnston of Montreal, Quebec, is seen
here in the Radicosa area during the Winter Line
campaign of January, 1944. He is carrying a Johnson
automatic rifle – one of the special weapons carried
by the Force and an unusual sight in the European
Theatre.
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At the present time, there appears to be no possible
employment for the Force in a winter operation during this
winter. To hold the Force in training without its engaging
in combat before the winter of 1943-44 would bring about
difficult problems.
The personnel of this Force, both United States and
Canadian, volunteered for hazardous duty and have subjected
themselves to a course of training more demanding and
rigorous than has ever been attempted elsewhere, in order
that they might be in top condition for combat… Both officers
and men are beginning to get restless and have frequently
stated that they volunteered for this Force in order to get into
combat early. The problems of morale and discipline that might
arise if the Force is continued in training for a prolonged period
might become serious…
The expense incident to maintaining this Force is great and is
not justified unless employment of the Force in an operation
utilizing its special equipment and training is definitely
foreseen. The United States is providing highly specialized and
valuable training not only for United States Army personnel,
but also for about seven hundred Canadian officers and
enlisted men…
The combat personnel of the Force are now in excellent
physical condition, and as a result of the training are able to
withstand severe and difficult conditions. While a prolonged
period of training would bring about greater proficiency in
tactics, use of weapons and the performance of specialists,
the detrimental effect on physical condition and spirit of the
personnel would offset the gain.
The employment of the Force is limited by the necessity of
securing from the Canadian authorities an agreement for the
participation of Canadian personnel in the Force. More than a
third of the officers and enlisted men of the Combat Echelon
are Canadians, and to employ the Force without the Canadian
personnel would seriously reduce the combat strength.
The commitment of the War Department to British authorities
for the continuation and training of this force are understood,
but it is believed that unless definite employment…in the near
future is foreseen, the unit should be discontinued and the
personnel reassigned…
Considering the capabilities of this Force and the limitations
upon its use, one of the following missions offers the most
profitable use and should be decided upon at this time:
Participation in an operation in the Aleutian Islands,
a.
if one is to be undertaken during the spring of 1943. The
Force could participate in a strong attack to drive the enemy
from Kiska or could be used independently in an operation
against the enemy on Attu. In view of the interest the Canadian
Government must feel in the Aleutian Islands, it is believed
that agreement to the employment of Canadian personnel in
this area would be readily obtained…
Transfer of the Force to the United Kingdom for
b.
employment on the Continent of Europe as a raiding force.

SC187868 G. Ronald collection, CWM/MCG Archives

Private Leonard adjusts medic Private Wilson’s first aid
packboard of blankets and plasma at the First Regiment
Aid Station. During the assault on Monte la Difensa,
FSSF positions at the summit were kept supplied by
means of a narrow footpath and packboards such as the
one seen here.

Canadian authorities should not object to participation of the
Canadian personnel. This employment offers little or no use
for the special snow vehicles and would not require the winter
training troops have received…
c.
Assignment of the Force to North Africa and
employment as a raiding force either in Africa or in the
Mediterranean area. The Canadian Government should not
object to this employment of Canadian personnel… The
specialized training, other than winter training, received by
personnel of the Force should particularly fit them for this type
of operation. The presence of the Force in this area would
ensure its being available where its employment is most likely.
(signed) Robert T. Frederick,
Colonel, First Special Service Force,
Commanding.

Frederick’s report of February 1943 highlights
the difficulty involved in finding a mission suited
to the highly specialized training and capabilities
of the First Special Service Force. Having ruled
out the possibility of a winter operation in 194243, his letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff listed
four possible alternatives for the First Special
Service Force in the coming year: the Aleutian
Islands, the European Theatre, North Africa, or
the Mediterranean. Over the next four months,
both the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the US War
Department gave serious consideration to these
and several other deployments. By Frederick’s
23
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First Special Service Force pack mules ascend a hillside in the rocky Italian countryside. During the mountain
fighting of January 1944, mules provided one of the best means of moving food and ammunition to the front.

account, one particularly busy day in Washington
had seen the Force assigned and reassigned to six
different missions in a period of fourteen hours.22
While Frederick was primarily concerned with
finding a mission, his letter also gives some
indication of the international complications
encountered by his command, most notably the
requirement of securing Canadian approval for
any proposed deployment. Prior to departing for
overseas, Frederick quite obviously considered
that Canadian involvement at the planning level
limited the unit’s usefulness to the US Army.
It remained to be seen whether the FSSF’s
performance in combat would justify the effort
devoted to organizing and training the unit.

A “Special” Reinforcements Crisis,
December 1943 – February 1944

B

etween February and August 1943, Allied
planners considered sending the Force to
theatres ranging from the British Isles to Burma
before finally committing the unit to the Aleutians
Campaign. Here, in August 1943, the First
Special Service Force acted as the spearhead of a
US-Canadian landing on the island of Kiska, but
when the Japanese garrison was found to have
secretly withdrawn and the island left abandoned,

the Force was quickly returned to the United
States for reassignment to the Mediterranean.
The FSSF arrived in Italy on 17 November 1943,
during a stalemate in the US Fifth Army’s drive
towards Rome. For nearly a month, the Allied
advance had been stalled before a belt of German
fortifications known as the Winter Line. On 24
November, the Force received orders to capture
the summit of Monte la Difensa, a mountain
stronghold that had been frustrating the Allied
advance since the first week of November. On
the night of 2-3 December, the FSSF’s Second
Regiment conducted a daring assault up the cliffs
on the north face of the mountain, which the
enemy had left unguarded as they were believed
to be impassable. After a violent firefight to secure
the summit, the Force held its ground against
repeated German counterattacks and artillery
bombardments – a six-day effort that cost the
Force some 511 casualties, or roughly a quarter
of the its total combat strength.23 The capture
of Monte la Difensa, however, destroyed a key
anchor of the Winter Line and earned high praise
for the FSSF from Lieutenant-General Mark W.
Clark, the Commanding General of Fifth Army:
The Special Service Force was given the
task of capturing la Difensa…the possession of

24
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which was vital to our further advance in that
sector. The mission was carried out at night in
spite of adverse weather conditions and heavy
enemy rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery
fire on the precipitous slopes over which it was
necessary to attack. Furthermore, the position
was maintained despite counterattacks and
difficulties of communication and supply. The
fact that you have acquitted yourself well in your
first action under enemy fire is a tribute to fine
leadership and a splendid reward for time spent
in arduous training.24

terrain, and determined German resistance
exacted a heavy toll. Extracts from the War Diary
of the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion
provide some insight into the nature of Force
operations during this period:

Following its success at Monte la Difensa,
the FSSF was assigned the right flank of the
US II Corps advance as it rolled up the German
defences in the mountains north of the Mignano
Gap, which guarded the entrance to the Liri Valley
and the Highway 6 to Rome. On Christmas Day,
First Regiment conducted a downhill frontal
assault against prepared German defences on
the western spur of Monte Sammucro. Though
the attack was successful, subsequent shelling
and losses to trench foot and exposure reduced
several companies in First Regiment to between
20 and 30 percent strength.25

January 9: Today’s Force casualty return has
122 names, again nearly half are frostbite and
exposure. There soon won’t be much left of the
Force if casualties keep up at this rate.

From New Year’s Day until 17 January, Third
Regiment entered the fray and fought a bitter
campaign to overcome the German defences on
Monte Majo. Here again, the bitter cold, difficult

January 8: Today’s casualty return…lists 100
names, half of them frostbite and exposure, the
rest battle casualties. The weather in the hills
is very cold, with high wind and snow. German
resistance is quite severe, artillery and mortar
fire is taking its toll.

January 10: News from the front is bad… The
Force is being thrown into one action after
another with only a handful of able-bodied men
left and no sign of their being relieved. Seventythree names on today’s casualty report, 40
frostbitten feet. Those returning to camp on light
duty say it is really rugged and they are all played
out. Three weeks tomorrow since they left here.26

By the time the Force was withdrawn
from the front on 17 January for rest and
reorganization, the casualties suffered to date
had reduced all three Regiments of the Force to
approximately 50% strength. These losses were
particularly devastating to the Canadian element,
as it had been decided in April 1943 that the

25
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A communications muleskinner points to Monte Cassino, where the Force was initially slated to take part in the assault
on a German-held monastery. Instead, the unit was sent to Anzio at the beginning of February.
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1st Canadian Special Service Battalion would
receive no reinforcements upon departure for
overseas. In light of this, and the fact that the
highly-specialized Force was “acting in a straight
infantry role as shock troops for the Fifth Army,”27
the acting senior Canadian officer of the Force,
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas P. Gilday, made a
startling recommendation to his superiors:
We have acquitted ourselves well in battle. There
is good feeling and many strong friendships
between the Canadians and Americans of the
Force. As new American reinforcements come
in and Canadians become fewer in number, it
will be increasingly difficult to keep the friendly
spirit and good relations that now exist. The
Canadian element is liable to become a source
of embarrassment to the Americans. It will also
become increasingly difficult to keep the existing
high morale when it becomes known that the
Canadians are going to be allowed to slowly
waste away.
I strongly recommend that the Canadian
element be withdrawn from the First Special
Service Force while there is enough of it left to
be of assistance to the Canadian Army. This
withdrawal should take place immediately before
the force is committed again in another phase
of operations and while the force is undergoing
re-organization.28

Gilday’s recommendation was subsequently
taken up by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart,
the newly-appointed Chief of Staff at Canadian
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, who
agreed that withdrawal of the 1st Canadian
Special Service Battalion should take place before
the Force returned to the front.29 In Stuart’s
opinion, pulling the Canadians out of the FSSF
would be difficult under any circumstances, but
doing so while the unit was actively engaged
was impossible as it would contradict earlier
agreements with the United States. In Ottawa,
however, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ)
took an even less favourable view, refusing to act
on Stuart and Gilday’s recommendation, citing
the following warning from the Canadian Army
Staff in Washington: “Any proposal to break up
this combined unit, which is not only in a theatre
of operations but is actually engaged against the
enemy, would prove embarrassing to a degree and
might be construed as hardly playing the game.
It would certainly be difficult to put across and
certainly would not enhance US regard for us.”30
The result of this disagreement between
Canadian officials in London and Ottawa was

a two-week exchange of telegrams across the
Atlantic, with CMHQ pressing for immediate
withdrawal of Canadians from the FSSF while
NDHQ in Ottawa considered other options. It was
not until 2 February that NDHQ finally relented
and agreed to raise the subject in Washington.
By this time, however, it was already too late.
Gilday’s recommendation had been
predicated on the FSSF not being engaged in
active operations, as this would allow a Canadian
withdrawal and reorganization of the Force to
take place with a minimum of inconvenience
to both parties. While the Canadian Army Staff
in Washington had been mistaken in assuming
that the Force was “engaged against the enemy”
at the time of their warning to Ottawa, by the
time NDHQ finally resolved to take the matter
up with Washington, the situation had changed
completely. On 31 January, the FSSF boarded
a small fleet of landing craft bound for the
port of Anzio, where the Force was to take up
defensive positions on the right flank of the newlyestablished Allied beachhead.
This return to the front eliminated any
possibility of the Canadians being withdrawn
from the Force. The irony is that if the Canadians
had actually approached the Americans before
the Force left for Anzio, in all likelihood they
would have found that many of their views were
shared not only by the authorities in Washington,
but also by the newly-promoted commander
of the Force, Brigadier-General Frederick. In
February, Frederick provided Lieutenant-General
Mark Clark with a detailed and rather blunt
report on the difficulties facing the First Special
Service Force almost three weeks following its
arrival at Anzio:31
19 February 1944
SUBJECT: First Special Service Force.
TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, U.S. Army.
Upon completion of the current phase of operations, it will be
necessary to know the basic decisions that have been made
for the future of the First Special Service Force. The combat
strength of the Force has been so reduced that it cannot again
take any major part in an operation, nor can it execute minor
actions for any long period.
following:

The possible decisions appear to be limited to the

a) Continue the Force as:
1)

A joint United States-Canadian unit.

2)

A US unit without Canadian personnel.
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Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick discusses the
results of an FSSF raid with Lieutenant Colonel Robert
S. Moore. A US Fifth Army tank is burning in the
background, 15 April 1944.
b) Discontinue the Force.
To continue the Force with its characteristics is not possible
under existing circumstances. The successes the Force has
achieved in combat have been the result of special training and
the development of certain qualities and spirit in the officers
and enlisted men. This training and development required a
comparatively long time under favorable training conditions.
Comparable results cannot be accomplished by the Force if
its casualties are replaced with men who are not specially
trained, nor without its full complement of officers who have
been indoctrinated with the spirit and combat methods of the
command.
There is no existing source, either United States or Canadian,
of trained replacements for the Force. A limited number of
officers can be obtained by commissioning non-commissioned
officers from the command, but this source is not great and
officers without trained enlisted men cannot accomplish those
missions considered normal for the Force.
If the Force is to be continued, it must be withdrawn from the
combat zone to a place where suitable training conditions and
facilities are available. After the arrival of new personnel, a
period of four to six months should be allowed to accomplish
their training.
The organization of the Force must be adjusted to the type of
operations in which the Force is being employed. The present
organization was created for a specific mission and was based
solely on the conditions surrounding the accomplishment of
that mission which was totally unrelated to the missions in
which the Force has actually engaged.
Likewise, the equipment of the Force must be changed so
that the Force will be properly equipped for the missions it
is to be assigned, rather than to engage in combat with the
handicap of unsuitable and inadequate equipment… Many
essential functions, such as medical service, communications
and supply during combat have not been provided and create
serious problems during the type of combat in which the Force
has engaged.
Originally, the Force was to be made up equally of Canadian
and United States personnel. This joint composition was
agreed upon at the request of Allied officials who were neither
American nor Canadian. It has no military basis, nor is it a
sound arrangement.
The Canadian Army furnishes no service troops, and all
overhead and administrative functions for the Force, except
for Canadian records and pay, are performed by United
States personnel. The Canadian officers and enlisted men are
subjected to strange conditions and to policies and practices
not encountered in the Canadian Army… The United States
has, by necessity, furnished all clothing and equipment for
Canadian as well as United States personnel. This has
required the Canadians to use weapons and equipment with
which they have no previous experience.
While the amalgamation of personnel of two armies into a
single unit has worked successfully, it is basically unsound
and difficult, and it has worked only because those intimately
associated with the administration and supervision of the
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arrangement have made it work.
Another complication is that employment of the Force must
be approved by Canada as well as the United States. In the
past, this has resulted in the Force not being sent to a theater
to which the War Department desired to assign it. In addition,
because of the inclusion of Canadian personnel in the Force,
the British Government has had to be consulted and its
agreement obtained for the Force’s employment.
The Canadian government has established a figure of seven
hundred (700) officers and other ranks as the Canadian
personnel to be assigned to the Force. This figure…was
based on an early estimate of the personnel to be required
for the original mission. It does not represent half the Force,
nor even half of the combat echelon. As a result of training
losses and losses that have occurred since arrival in this
theater, Canadian officers and other ranks now assigned to
the Force total slightly more than three hundred (300). The
Canadian Army headquarters in Ottawa decided that no
Canadian replacements were to be furnished for the Force,
and this decision appears to be firm.
If the Force is to be continued as a joint United StatesCanadian unit, the Canadian Army should furnish officers and
other ranks to bring the Canadian strength up to half of the
total strength of the Force. To absorb new Canadian personnel
it will, of course, be necessary to withdraw from the combat
zone for an extended period so that the Canadians can be
given necessary training.
If the Force is to be continued as a United States unit without
Canadian personnel, problems of organization, equipment,
and qualified replacements and training still exist. In addition,
other problems less tangible but more far-reaching are
introduced. The international character of the Force has placed
it in the position of representing the extent to which the United
States and Canada can cooperate in an undertaking. It is an
exceptional example of complete integration of personnel
of two armies into a single unit. The Force has become
well known as a joint American-Canadian force, particularly
in Canada where knowledge of its existence has become
widespread. For the Force to continue in existence without
Canadian personnel might bring about serious repercussions,
particularly in Canada where the elimination of Canadian
participation in the Force may be misconstrued…
The elimination of Canadian personnel from the Force would
deprive the unit of many of its key officers and men. When the
Force was activated, the Canadian Army furnished, in general,
better qualified officers and enlisted men than did the United
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States Army, and this has resulted in a large number of the
key positions being filled by Canadians.
It is considered that, because of the possible unfavorable
reaction, both official and public, that would arise if the
Canadian participation in the Force is dropped, it is better
either to continue the Force as a joint force, or to discontinue
it…
The entire existence of the Force, until it was transferred to
the North African Theater of Operations, was countenanced by
the War Department only because of its international character
and because of the interest of British officials, which no longer
exists. The joint composition of the Force creates problems
that must be solved without precedent or legal support. It
is believed that the War Department would welcome the
opportunity to discontinue this special unit, which has been
a particular problem and unduly expensive.
Special units, such as this Force, are not looked upon
with favor by other units of the Army. There is an intense
feeling of dislike arising from the belief that special units are
particularly favored and that they receive too much credit for
their accomplishments. This feeling has been encountered
quite generally, particularly in those normal units that have not
been associated with this Force in operations. While this point
is not of importance, it is worthy of consideration in deciding
whether this and other units should exist.
Unless provisions are made for the reorganization, reequipment and replacement of personnel losses with
adequately trained personnel, the Force will soon become an
ineffective combat unit. Because of the international interest
in the unit, it would be better that it be discontinued before
any strained feelings are created and while it is looked upon
with favor by both interested nations. The whole project is
delicate and has potentialities for international complications.
Should the Force encounter disaster in combat, it is possible
that the Canadians at home may feel that their officers and
men were unnecessarily sacrificed. Likewise, there is always
the possibility of criticism for placing American soldiers under
Canadian officers and non-commissioned officers should the
fortune of battle be against them.
For the sake of United States and Canadian relations, it may
be best to let this unit pass out of existence while it is still in
its prime, rather than to sustain it through a period when it will
be remembered only for its faults and defects.
Robert T. Frederick,
Brigadier-General, US Army,
Commanding.

One year after recommending that that the
First Special Service Force be committed to
action at the earliest opportunity, Frederick’s
letter of 19 February 1944 expressed grave
concern over the long-term viability of the Force,
noting in particular that after two months of
sustained combat, the unit “cannot again take
any major part in an operation, nor can it execute
minor actions for any long period.” Having made
no provision for replacing combat losses, and
with no existing source of trained replacements

– either Canadian or American – Frederick was of
the opinion that the FSSF should be disbanded
at the earliest opportunity…“rather than sustain
it through a period when it will be remembered
only for its faults and defects.” Though fully aware
of the international difficulties involved, the letter
leaves no doubt that Frederick now considered
the bi-national composition of the Force to be a
significant impediment that should be done away
with as soon as possible. This, he felt, would be
in the best interests of both nations. What his
letter fails to consider, however, is whether such
disbandment was even possible now that the
Force had been committed to holding the line at
Anzio.

Reorganization Under Fire,
Spring 1944

T

wo days after Frederick’s letter to Fifth Army,
Lieutenant-General Stuart sent the following
cable to the Chief of General Staff in Ottawa: “The
whole question of the future of the First Special
Service Force is apparently now in the melting
pot. I was called by telephone on Friday by [the]
Chief of Combined Operations, who told me
that…the Americans were now proposing that
the force be disbanded, but hesitated to make
specific recommendations until they knew the
Canadian reaction to this proposal.”32 Within
the FSSF itself, both Frederick and Gilday, the
acting senior Canadian officer, now considered
disbandment to be the best course of action. The
Chief of Staff at CMHQ agreed, as did the CGS
in Ottawa and the Canadian Army authorities
in Italy. On the American side, General Jacob
Devers, Commanding General of US forces in
the North African Theater had also suggested
that the Force be inactivated and the personnel
reassigned. 33 Opposed, however, were those
commanders who were more immediately
concerned with the situation at Anzio, including
General Eisenhower and Lieutenant-General
Clark.
By the first week of March, the matter had been
settled between the Anglo-American authorities
and Clark’s Fifth Army was allowed to retain
the FSSF as a combined US-Canadian unit.
In Italy, the Canadian Army was instructed to
bring the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion
back up to strength by drawing volunteers from
the existing infantry reinforcement pools in the
Mediterranean Theatre. Fifth Army, meanwhile,
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Colonel Edwin A. Walker, who assumed command of the FSSF after Frederick’s departure, is seen here observing
enemy positions in the Radicosa area. With him are Major Robert B. Walker of Wakima, Washington; Major J.M. Sector
of Winnipeg, Manitoba; and Captain Frank W. Erikson of New Jersey. 16 January 1944.

went a step further in its effort to rebuild the Force
when Clark decided “to increase its strength,
revise its organization and equipment, and
re-orient its mission to encompass essentially
Ranger actions and, at least in part, paratroop
capabilities.”34 Frederick’s letter of 19 February
had recommended that the organization and
equipment of the Force should be brought in line
with the missions to which it was being assigned
and this was exactly what Clark intended to do.
On 8 March, Fifth Army assigned the 456th
Parachute Field Artillery Battalion as a permanent
attachment to the FSSF and ordered the US 4th
Ranger Battalion inactivated to provide the Force
with roughly 20 officer and 500 enlisted man
replacements.35 In doing so, Clark’s intent was
to reorganize the First Special Service Force and
expand the unit from its current strength of 2,000
men to as much as 3,500 – an organization that
would “combine the best of Fifth Army’s special
troops into a hard-hitting, well-led unit which will
be of even greater value to the Army Commander
than its very excellent component parts.”36
This was easier said than done. In March
1944, the officers and men of both the Ranger
Battalions and First Special Service Force were

equally convinced that theirs was most élite
formation of the United States Army. This created
some degree of tension when Fifth Army opted to
combine these “very excellent component parts”
into an expanded First Special Service Force.
Many of the former Rangers resented being
assigned to the Force: “We were amazed by the
apparent lack of organization in the Force – we
were also the outsiders coming into a new unit
– we felt that we had been taken advantage of as
we were never given the opportunity to join the
Ranger Battalions forming in England.”37 The
FSSF, meanwhile, considered many of these
replacements to be “Rangers in name only,”
as those Rangers with more than two years of
overseas service had been returned to the United
States as instructors.38 Overall, the integration
of Ranger replacements into the First Special
Service Force was not easily accomplished.
Canadian replacements, on the other hand,
had literally lined up to volunteer for the Force,
drawn by the unit’s reputation and the promise of
higher pay. In April, the Canadian Army provided
the FSSF with 15 officers and 240 other ranks
replacements, though the officer responsible for
the Canadian reinforcement stream in Italy had
to personally intervene in order to prevent these
29
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men from being sent to Anzio without proper
training: “With the Canadian reinforcements
totally unacquainted with American weapons,
customs and methods of fighting, I am somewhat
concerned that in the event of these troops being
involved in combat, there is a possibility of loss
of life because of unfamiliarity with weapons.”39
Seeing the point, Frederick agreed to provide the
Canadians with two weeks of instruction by Force
officers and NCOs before they were sent to the
beachhead. Arriving at the port of Anzio on 27
April, the Canadian replacements were divided
among the three regiments of the Force.40
At this time, the FSSF was preparing for
a role in one of three possible plans for the
upcoming breakout from Anzio, which would see
US VI Corps fight its way out of the beachhead
and rejoin Fifth Army for an advance on Rome.
Each of the scenarios under consideration would
require the FSSF to operate in conjunction not
only with the units on its flanks, but also the
artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers that would
be attached to the Force itself. Although the FSSF,
by this time, had gained extensive experience in
working with artillery, tank-infantry cooperation
remained a relatively new concept to the Force. In
April, however, by rotating units off the front line
during the hours of daylight, the Force was able
to conduct some fifteen exercises in tank-infantry
cooperation in an effort to overcome this lack of
experience.
Training exercises provided valuable
experience and offered a chance to integrate the
large number of US and Canadian replacement
personnel into the regiments. Further, in keeping
with Frederick’s earlier recommendation that the
Force needed to be properly equipped for the type
of operations in which it was to be employed,
attachments to the FSSF for the upcoming
breakout included the 463rd Parachute Field
Artillery Battalion; D Company, 39th Combat
Engineer Regiment; two companies of the 645th
Tank Destroyer Battalion; A Company, 191st
Tank Battalion; the mortars of B Company, 84th
Chemical Battalion; and a Collecting Company
from the 52nd Medical Battalion.41 Unfortunately,
some of these attachments were made effective
only days before the breakout began, which
offered little time for them to train with the Force
prior to the operation.

The breakout from Anzio began on the
morning of 23 May 1944. During the opening
phases of the attack, the FSSF made a rapid
advance to cut Highway 7 and the rail line beyond,
but was then forced into a temporary withdrawal
when a counterattack by German Tigers
knocked-out much of the supporting armour
and shattered two of First Regiment’s forward
companies. Following a brief reorganization, on
25 May, Third Regiment advanced to secure the
heights of Monte Arrestino, from which the Force
continued through Cori and Rocca Massima to
the town of Artena. It was here, on 28 May, that
the FSSF advanced in the face of concentrated
fire from German artillery, tanks, and small arms
in a five-hour attack to sever the enemy’s line
of communications along Highway 6. Pushing
the advance in the direction of Valmontone and
Colleferro, it was not until 2 June that the latter
town was captured in an attack led by Second
Regiment. Effective the next day, Task Force
Howze – comprised of the 81st Reconnaissance
Battalion and the 13th Armored Infantry – was
attached to the FSSF to provide armoured
support for the unit’s advance on Rome. Fighting
its way through tough resistance on the outskirts
of the city, on 4 June the FSSF made the first
permanent entrance of Allied soldiers into Rome,
where a day of intermittent street fighting ended
in the capture of eight bridges over the River
Tiber.
With Rome in Allied hands, the First Special
Service Force was transferred to a nearby rest
area on the shores of Lake Albano. It was at
Lake Albano, while recovering from wounds
suffered in a skirmish near the Tiber bridges,
that Frederick had an opportunity to consider
the “lessons learned” on the road from Anzio
to Rome. Firstly, it had not been possible in
one month to train FSSF replacements to the
standard of the original personnel, just as he had
warned in his letter of 19 February. No amount of
enthusiasm on the part of these volunteers could
equal the full year of intense training provided
at Helena, Montana. Second, it was immediately
apparent that armoured and artillery support
had been absolutely critical to the success of
recent FSSF operations – just as they would be for
any conventional United States infantry regiment
conducting conventional, infantry battles. When
the supporting armour was destroyed during
the breakout from Anzio, the advance faltered
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and two forward companies of the Force were
overrun. Five days later, at Artena, supporting
artillery had been essential, both in preparing
the ground over which the Force would advance
and in repelling the German counterattacks that
followed. With these lessons in mind, on 22 June,
Frederick made the following recommendation to
Lieutenant-General Clark:42
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE,
U.S. ARMY
TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, U.S. Army
After deliberate consideration of the many factors involved,
it is recommended that the First Special Service Force be
organized and equipped in accordance with the Tables of
Organization and Equipment for an Infantry Regiment, with
the addition of one (1) battalion of light Field Artillery.
The non-availability of replacements specially trained for
the Force, and the absence of facilities for training those
replacements received to the standards of the original
personnel, make it less desirable to continue the force under
a special organization.
The present equipment of the force includes large quantities
of parachute and winter warfare equipment. Such a small
percentage of the present personnel of the force have received
parachute or winter training that there is no necessity for
maintaining this special equipment for the command.
The missions that have been assigned to the Force in combat
have in most instances required the use of equipment
normal to an Infantry regiment. This particularly applies to
communication equipment. For each operation it has been
necessary to make arrangements for the temporary use of
necessary equipment.
The operation for which the Force was originally organized did
not require the medical personnel or motor transport that have
been found necessary in the execution of missions assigned.
Reorganization as an Infantry Regiment would correct these
deficiencies.
Robert T. Frederick,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

The Force without Frederick?

F

rederick’s letter of 22 June 1944 is perhaps
best considered as the Force Commander’s
“parting shot,” written on the day before his
departure to command the First Airborne Task
Force in the upcoming invasion of Southern
France. On 23 June 1944, Frederick ordered
the First Special Service Force assembled near
the shore of Lake Albano for the presentation of
awards. It was here that the Force Commander
announced that he had been reassigned and
was leaving the FSSF. “A discernable, protesting

gasp broke the hush in the ranks of men who
normally withheld such sentiments. The General
carried the confidence and admiration of his
men…. From the first fight to the last, memories
of combat would evoke visions of the General up
forward somewhere with the men who did the
fighting.”43 On the day of Frederick’s departure, a
saddened entry in the Canadian War Diary reads:
“He has been the driving power behind the Force
and its future is now in the air.”44 Without having
read Frederick’s letter of 22 June, the officer who
wrote this entry could not have known how close
to the mark he actually was.
In July, General Clark endorsed Frederick’s
recommendations for reorganizing the FSSF in a
letter to the commander of the US Army’s North
African Theater. In this letter, Clark forwarded
Frederick’s suggestion that the current temporary
attachments to the FSSF – the field artillery,
combat engineers, and medical services – should
be made permanent and the Force reorganized as
an infantry regimental combat team.45 In his letter
of 22 June, Frederick had cited two overriding
reasons why this was necessary, the first being
the impossibility of training replacements to
the standard of the original personnel and,
second, that the missions recently assigned
to the Force had differed little from those that
were regularly assigned to an infantry regiment.
Further, from the Anzio breakout onwards, it had
been necessary to make special arrangements
for provisional attachments and the temporary
loan of equipment. This was something that
Frederick hoped an extensive reorganization of
the First Special Service Force might correct and
that Mark Clark’s support would help to make a
reality.
Over the next six months, the new Force
Commander, Colonel Edwin A. Walker, fought a
rearguard action to save the FSSF as a special
unit, but his efforts were ultimately doomed to
failure. Although Walker repeatedly attempted to
retain the Canadian element of the Force, both
Canadian and American authorities now agreed
with Frederick’s earlier assessment that the binational composition of the Force introduced
unnecessarily complex difficulties for both
parties. Thus on 5 December 1944, the First
Special Service Force was disbanded after a final
parade in Villeneuve-Loubet, France, at which
time the Canadians were returned to their own
army and the American element reorganized to
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form the 474th Infantry Regiment, complete with
its own anti-tank company, heavy machine guns,
mortars, and vehicles – all the things Frederick
had been asking for since Anzio in order to do
the type job the Force was being asked to do.
In his letter of 19 February 1944, Frederick
suggested that the time had come to let the
Force “pass out of existence while it is still in
its prime, rather than to sustain it through a
period when it will be remembered only for its
faults and defects.”46 In hindsight, this warning
seems depressingly exaggerated. Today, the
First Special Service Force is remembered both
in Canada and the United States as the “North
Americans” who broke the Winter Line atop
Monte la Difensa and went on to become the
first Allied formation to enter Rome. The Force
is not, as Frederick once predicted it would
be, remembered for its faults and defects. Nor
should it be. During its brief existence, the Force
established an enviable combat record – and did
so despite the difficulties described in Frederick’s
letters. On the ground, the FSSF proved
repeatedly that Canadians and Americans could
be molded into an extremely effective fighting
unit. Viewed from above, however, the special
status and international character of the Force
introduced unique difficulties that were never
fully resolved before the unit was disbanded in
December 1944. Changes made to overcome
these difficulties came too late to rescue the Force
from disbandment, though it must be said that
at least one of Frederick’s stated objectives was
achieved when the Force was allowed to “pass out
of existence” in December 1944, before its faults
and defects threatened to overshadow any of its
achievements.
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